

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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The current 'war on terrorism' is a recent and still evolving construct. In the process of looking specifically at its implications it is necessary to examine its genesis and character. But I won't comment on the events of September 11, 2001, except to say they were the largest and most visible act of terror in history. The media impact was gigantic, and has been sustained by the fact that '9/11' has become the new American 'day of infamy', central to a vast propaganda edifice. Similarly, the October 12 terrorism in Bali recently is becoming the centrepiece of aggressive Australian political agendas and propaganda.

President Bush announced a 'war on terror' when he spoke to a joint session of Congress ten days after the September 11 attack. His powerful and carefully prepared speech was intended to be a blueprint for a long-term American moral, political and military policy. This policy was elaborated in a number of major speeches, such as his State of the Union Address to Congress on 30 January 2002, and his speech to the Graduation Exercise at West Point Military Academy on 1 June 2002, and many minor repeats. In late September 2002 Bush released a lengthy document titled *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, which brought together under nine section headings the essence of what he and his advisers had been saying over the previous year. Collectively, these documents deserve very close examination, particularly of the rhetoric, the rationales for action, the shape of the mission – this war on terrorism – and the assumptions and implications, both implicit and explicit.¹

Bush's first major speech set the theme. The issues were 'good' versus 'evil', the 'civilised' versus the 'uncivilised', the defenders of 'freedom' and 'justice' and 'progress' versus 'murderers' who use 'terror' and 'fear' and 'destruction'. The terrorists were thugs and criminals, linked to 'the murderous ideologies' of the past. The issue was simple: 'Freedom and fear are at war.' The target was plain: 'Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.' The threat was also plain: 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.' This was to be a lengthy campaign, but the 'cause' was just, and victory was 'certain'.

Some of the key characteristics of this 'war on terrorism' are worth noting. The first is a distinctive interpretation of history which places America at the centre of a new world view. Bush spoke at West Point of 'a single surviving model of human progress'. America is the epitome of this vision. The opening sentence of the recent National Security Strategy asserts:

The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.

Integral to this view of history is a belief in an American ‘mission’, a ‘crusade’ (although the history of that word led to its retraction), a belief labelled over a century ago as ‘manifest destiny’. Bush said in his first September 11 speech: ‘... in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.’ In his State of the Union speech he said: ‘In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we’ve been called to a unique role in human events.’ By his West Point speech he likened that graduating class to ‘the class of 1942 – six months after Pearl Harbour’, and asserted: ‘History has also issued its call to your generation.’

Secondly, the American leadership has not the slightest doubt about its ability to arbitrate for the whole world, to identify the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’, the ‘civilised’ and the ‘uncivilised’, those standing for ‘freedom’ against ‘tyranny’, those who are ‘with us’ and those ‘against us’, those possessing threatening ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and those merely having these same weapons for their own protection. Implicit in all this is the presumption to be able to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable violence and destruction.

Thirdly, the definition of ‘terrorism’ at the heart of this war is vague and changeable. The National Security Strategy says simply:

The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.

Such a definition, applied rigorously and even-handedly, would have most states in the world accused of some form of terrorism. But it is purely political rhetoric, permitting selective and self-serving application. Although the Taliban and Al Qaeda were the original targets, they were ‘linked to many other organisations in different countries’. Bush added, ‘There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries.’ His State of the Union speech widened the ambit:

Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning.

He referred to ‘terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons’, named three ‘regimes that sponsor terror’ – North Korea, Iran and Iraq – and labelled them ‘an axis of evil’. In May three more states – Syria, Libya and Cuba – were added to the list, as US Undersecretary of State John Bolton warned: ‘beyond the axis of evil there are other rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction – particularly biological weapons.’

In short, America defines the targets in this new war. Doubts that forcible ‘regime change’ in Iraq was a legitimate part of the ‘war on terrorism’, strengthened by the series of terrorist attacks off Yemen and in Kuwait, the Philippines and Bali, have been summarily dismissed. Bush asserted: ‘We will fight, if need be, the war on terror on two fronts. We’ve got plenty of capacity to do so.’ Colin Powell has preached the same sermon, particularly to Australia, assuring us: ‘Australia is a sheriff in its own right. The fact that we are standing together at high noon, time after time over the last hundred years, side by side as partners, should speak to the value we place on our relationship with Australia.’² A deceptive mishmash of history and rhetoric!

Finally, although there are statements about peaceful methods of pursuing the ‘war on terrorism’, the only methods given any real support are aggressive and militaristic. The National Security Strategy has as section headings statements such as: ‘Champion Aspirations

for Human Dignity’, ‘Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts’, and ‘Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.’ Indeed, Bush said at West Point, ‘We have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with hope of a better day.’ However, the main policies pursued are policing and military action. The National Security Strategy, after naming ‘shadowy networks of individuals’, stated: ‘To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal – military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.’

Moreover, at West Point, Bush proposed a new aggressive strategy for the war on terrorism. He argued that ‘the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment’ were no longer adequate: ‘If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. (Applause)’. America must ‘confront the worst threats before they emerge. (Applause)’. In short, selective pre-emptive military strikes were announced. This was further developed in the National Security statement, which argued that international jurists ‘often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.’ The point is then made: ‘We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.’

One of the most striking implications of all this is that it largely ignores the lessons of the history of terrorism. For a start, the use of terror is nothing new, but as old as violent conflict itself. In about 500 BC, Sun Tzu wrote: ‘Kill one, frighten ten thousand.’³ Some of our current terminology comes from this history, such as zealot (from the fanatical anti-Roman Jewish sect), assassin (from the anti-Crusader Muslim hashish-eaters), and the word fanatic itself (originally religious extremism, from the Latin for temple). In short, deep belief in any end may produce violent means. But history also tends to show that it is neither wise nor effective to pursue terrorism primarily by military means. It is in many ways counter-productive, because it ignores the origins of terrorism, the climate of opinion which fosters extremism, and the grievances that generate hatred, and plays into the hands of the terrorists by reinforcing the original prejudices.

Next, the issue of defining terrorism is complicated by perspective and purpose, particularly illustrated in the differences between scholarly analysis and political usage. One American commentator on terrorism, Noam Chomsky, emphasises the distinction between what he calls ‘the ordinary sense’, where there are precise definitions and categories, and ‘a technical Orwellian sense’, determined by political reasons of state, and used to label enemies but shield that state’s own activities from scrutiny. Similarly, historian Eric Hobsbawm argues that there is a difference between the ‘violence of marginal groups’ and ‘structural violence’.⁴

Even the US authorities do not agree on a single definition. The FBI (‘the unlawful use of force or violence’) and the CIA (‘premeditated, politically motivated violence ... by subnational groups or clandestine agents’) use different definitions.⁵ But both are self-serving; *they* decide who are terrorists and who are not. This issue of perspective is frequently summed up with the old adage, ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ However, in order to analyse the ‘war on terrorism’, as well as combat terrorism effectively, we need to define it clearly and apply it impartially. Put simply, terrorism is the selective use of violence to intimidate, terrorise and coerce for social or political purposes, carried out not only by individuals and groups, but by organisations and states.

The history of terrorism reveals other implications. Modern terrorism entered history with the French Revolution as a policy of state, with the ‘Reign of Terror’ under the Committee of Public Safety in the second half of 1793. The term ‘Terror’ was openly used by the Jacobins; the underlying philosophy was that the ends justified the means.⁶ From then to now, terrorism has been symptomatic, reflecting current ideological and material conflicts,

developing new philosophical justifications and strategies, utilising new technologies and striking at relevant symbolic targets.⁷ By the 1980s terrorism was endemic, with an expanding range of ideological and practical motivations. Moreover, it was increasingly used by states such as America and Israel (though not labelled terrorism by them)⁸ and became part of the politics and rhetoric of the Cold War.

Leaders of the 'West', led by the United States, labelled the Soviet Union as the fountainhead of all sorts of terrorism. President Ronald Reagan launched a campaign against 'the evil scourge of terrorism', identifying the ultimate source as 'the evil empire' itself. Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Soviet Union of 'training, funding and equipping' terrorism targeted at the West. His successor George Schultz said the goal of these 'depraved opponents of civilisation itself', inspired by their Soviet paymasters, was to 'shake the West's self-confidence, unity, and will to resist intimidation'.⁹

On the other side of the fence, the United States was accused of a pattern of international oppression, interference and violence. Its army was all over the world, it supported Zionist aggression by Israel, it engineered the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile, it trained agents who committed atrocities back in their home countries, and so on.¹⁰ Anti-American rhetoric was widespread; it was the arch-Satan. It was a powerful incentive to terrorism. After Allende's murder in Chile on September 11, 1973, there was a surge of recruiting for the Red Brigades and other groups.

The preceding examination of the genesis and character of the 'war on terrorism' now permits a number of more specific conclusions.

Firstly, there has been a world wide tendency to exploit the September 11 tragedy. The Governments of Israel, Russia and China were quick to use the American situation to label their opponents and pursue retaliatory policies in Palestine, Chechnya and Xinjiang. Pakistan, an aider and abettor of terrorism, has regained American approval. India and Pakistan have stirred up the Kashmir issue. America is aiding the Philippines and Georgia against terrorism. And so on. If you can label your opponents 'terrorists', you can claim the high moral ground for your own actions, including the use of violence and terror. According to *The Guardian* of 31 January 2002: 'From Teheran to Khartoum to Harare, political leaders climbed aboard the anti-terrorism bandwagon with a view to domestic advantage as well as Washington's aid and approbation.'

Moreover, President Bush himself is now exploiting and manipulating the tragedy that happened to his own country for international and domestic political advantage. His State of the Union Speech used the rhetoric of leadership of the free world to resurrect a reactionary agenda going back to Ronald Reagan and George Bush senior. Old targets are put on the firing range, Star Wars missile defence is resurrected, the bogey of 'weapons of mass destruction' is presented afresh. The claim that there are 'thousands of dangerous killers ... often supported by outlaw regimes', is a blank cheque to be filled in later. Republican domestic policies have also been linked to the 'war on terrorism'. Support for investment, big business, armament industries, developers of energy and oil resources and so on, now have the imprimatur of 'homeland security'. Interestingly, the National Security document (Section IX) comments: 'Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing.' Not surprisingly, the timing of the current focus on Iraq appears to be related to the imminent mid-term Congressional elections.

Secondly, the diplomatic and strategic methods by which America is pursuing the 'war on terrorism' are a serious challenge to international institutions such as the United Nations and to international standards and relations. The concept of anticipatory pre-emptive attack is dangerous, and is not an accepted part of international legal custom. When in 1981 Israel, claiming 'anticipatory self-defence', launched a pre-emptive strike against an Iraqi nuclear

reactor, the UN Security Council, including the United States, condemned Israel's actions as illegal. Even Margaret Thatcher said that such attacks could not be justified.

In an article in the *Australian*, Australia's most experienced military leaders were quoted as warning against unilateral American action such as a pre-emptive strike. Among them, General Peter Gration, former commander of Australia's defence force (1987–93), said 'I am very concerned that potentially we are on the verge of what could be a breakdown in the global security system.' He added, 'If this idea of a preventative war becomes widely accepted, who knows where it will stop.'¹¹

Similarly, former US Vice-President Al Gore specifically challenged the pre-emptive basis of the whole strategy, as a serious danger to the international rule of law. 'That concept would be replaced by the notion that there is no law but the discretion of the President of the United States.' It is worth noting that neither 'anticipatory self-defence' nor 'pre-emptive strike' (or any other such Orwellian Newspeak) is justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter. It speaks only of 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.'¹² This right of self-defence is not an open-ended right. To be a valid act under customary international law, as set down in the classic formulation by United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster after the 1837 Caroline incident, it is generally required to be absolutely necessary, proportionate in scope and relatively immediate.¹³

Thirdly, in their zeal the American Government has seriously undermined the very respect for human rights and the rule of law on which it bases the claim to be the leader of the free world. Executive orders have permitted the questioning of recently arrived Middle Eastern men, detention without charge, eavesdropping on privileged attorney-client communications, and the secret trial of suspected foreign terrorists by special military tribunals. Attorney General John Ashcroft commented: 'Foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United States, in my judgment, are not entitled to and do not deserve the protection of the American Constitution.' The holding of prisoners from Afghanistan at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba is a device to avoid designating them as criminals, or prisoners of war, or even terrorists, and deny them proper legal rights.

Critics pointed to the hypocrisy of defending a way of life by abandoning values basic to that way of life. The American Civil Liberties Union criticised the Bush Administration for 'increasingly appearing willing to circumvent the Bill of Rights'. Nonetheless, the American Patriot Act of October 2001 enormously expanded the powers of the authorities by 'removing obstacles to investigating terrorism'.¹⁴ The new Cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security has created an administrative juggernaut conceived as a weapon in the 'war on terrorism'. Other countries followed suit. In Britain, Blair introduced legislation to permit detention without trial and other curbs on civil liberties, harking back to the discredited policies used against the IRA decades earlier. In Australia the Government proposed legislation on terrorism which seriously undermined civil liberties. Although tempered in the political process, the Bali bombings have led to renewed demands to extend the power of authorities such as ASIO in ways that endanger the very rights and freedoms said to be hated by the terrorists.

Internationally, flouting of the rule of law is being justified by the 'war on terrorism.' The International Criminal Court came into effect on 1 July 2002. Despite originally supporting the proposal, the US withdrew from participation, determined that no Americans would face 'foreign' tribunals on war crimes charges. Even Australia, after some hawing and specious debate about 'sovereignty' and 'untrustworthy foreign judges', joined the new body. But continued American animosity now takes the form of demanding bilateral guarantees of immunity for its nationals, putting Americans beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, with some limited success.

In late July, the UN's Economic and Social Council recommended, with 35 in favour, eight against and ten abstentions, the General Assembly adopt the draft optional protocol to the Convention against Torture. This would have permitted the creation of a process for regular visits by independent bodies to places of incarceration, including prisons and refugee centres, in order to prevent cruel practices and torture. Australia, in company with China, Cuba, Libya, Nigeria and the Sudan, voted against it. The United States abstained.

Opportunities to practice some of what they preach are ignored. The UN World Food Summit in Rome in June 2002, called to discuss the failure of previously agreed measures, was ignored by leaders of the world's richest countries, including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Japan. They were sharply criticised by UN President Kofi Annan, who warned that poverty and despair could breed terrorism. 'I don't want to say that the poor are terrorists, but those who live in a situation of disadvantage can more easily be manipulated by terrorists.' Similarly, at the World Summit on Sustainability in Johannesburg early in September, announcements by various countries (particularly Russia and China) enabled implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emission. Australia and the United States remain the only two developed countries opposing the treaty.

Fourthly, the rhetoric and methods of the 'war on terrorism' seriously exacerbate the 'double standard' and 'hypocrisy' which is enshrined within virtually all the policies of the leading powers. According to Richard Butler, they are embedded, for example, in the 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', which came into force in March 1970. The NPT required existing nuclear-weapon states not to transfer weapons or assist acquisition by others, and non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive or acquire nuclear weapons. All signatories also undertook to 'pursue negotiations in good faith' to halt the arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament and achieve 'a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.' But nuclear powers did very little in this direction. Butler sharply criticised the 'hypocrisy' of the United States and other major powers for insisting on their right to retain nuclear weapons while demanding that others dispense with theirs or never obtain them.

Butler is also former head of the UN Special Commission on Weapon Inspection in Iraq, and experienced the same hypocrisy. He stated in his recent Templeton Lecture at the University of Sydney:

I confess too that I flinch when I hear American, British, and French fulminations against weapons of mass destruction, ignoring the fact that they are the proud owners of massive quantities of those weapons, unapologetically insisting that they are essential for their national security, and will remain so.¹⁵

Next day at a Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies workshop he said that he was stunned by the 'deafness' of Americans to the inherent hypocrisy of their stance on nuclear weapons. In all his contact with leading Americans, his attempts to have them 'enter into discussions about double standards have been an abject failure' and that the 'fundamental sense of unfairness' created by this was dangerous.

It is worth noting that since the election of the Bush Administration in 2000, the US has withdrawn from the nuclear test ban treaty, is apparently attempting to create 'bunker-busting' nuclear weapons, and has refused to allow its own laboratories to be inspected under the biological weapons treaty.¹⁶ It is worth further noting that according to a 1994 Senate Banking Committee Report, the American Centre for Disease Control and an American company transferred to Iraq several strains of all the germs that Iraq has admitted using to make weapons. This included anthrax, the bacteria that makes botulinum toxin, and the bacteria that cause gas gangrene. The transfers occurred during Ronald Reagan's Presidency

in the 1980s, when the US was supporting Iraq in its war against Iran. Interestingly, the special Middle East envoy at the time was Donald Rumsfeld, who met Saddam Hussein on several occasions. At a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Rumsfeld denied having heard of any such thing, denied having any knowledge of it, and said he doubted it.¹⁷ I guess Mandy Rice Davies, of Profumo Affair fame, made the appropriate rejoinder when she said: ‘Well, he would say that, wouldn’t he.’

Finally, there is little new about the current ‘war on terrorism’, apart from its scope, intensity and the centrality of the American role. Those leading it are shaping it to be the New Cold War, encompassing and dividing the whole world, fought with similar rhetoric and damage to human rights and civil liberties, but possibly more force and violence, than the previous Cold War. The original Cold War was in many ways an artificial construct, what one analyst called an ‘imaginary war’, based on the need of each side for an opponent and fuelled by mutual perceptions of an historic struggle between good and evil.¹⁸ But nuclear weapons were real enough, as were a series of ‘small’ wars in remote parts of the world. Although this New Cold War lacks the symmetry of the first, and takes its shape from American perceptions of threat and methods of response, the weapons and the likely wars are threateningly real.

The features of the New Cold War will mirror the original: the rhetoric of good and evil, civilised and uncivilised, them and us, take our side or suffer the consequences; the oversimplification and labelling and demonising, the endless sending of signals and messages; inflated military budgets, reduced care for domestic issues; the justification of violence, including terrorism itself, to defend the national interest; the opportunity to settle old scores; the collusion of the media in inflaming feelings and sustaining morale; the curbing of freedom of speech and access to information, and attacks on critics as traitors; the reduction of civil liberties and human rights, undermining the very values supposedly being defended; and the hypocrisy of supporting some terrorism while condemning other users.

It is worth remembering that terrorism has a long history; and that those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Also the comment of Octave Mirabeau, French writer and dramatist (1850–1917):

The greatest danger of bombs is in the explosion of stupidity that they provoke.

¹ These documents can be found on a number of official websites, such as: ‘America Responds to Terrorism, What is the War on Terrorism?’ at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/>.

² *The Australian*, Bush quoted on 17 October 2002, Powell on 21 October 2002.

³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, and Clutterbuck, p 61.

⁴ Noam Chomsky, ‘International Terrorism: Diplomacy by Other Means’, in R Smoker, R Davies & B Munske (eds), 1990, *A Reader in Peace Studies*, Pergamon Press Oxford, pp 65–8. E Hobsbawm in W J Mommsen & G Hirschfeld (eds), 1982, *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe*, pp 14–15.

⁵ FBI definition cited at Terrorism Research Center Inc website, <http://www.terrorism.com>; CIA definition cited from US Legal Code, Title 22, Ch 38, Sec 2656f (d)2, at website <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2656f>.

⁶ The phrase ‘the reign of terrorism’ entered English in 1795.

⁷ Among the most studied terrorist groups are the Baader–Meinhof Gang from Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (and its splinter groups), the Irish Republican Army (and its splinter groups), and the Basque separatist movement called ETA.

⁸ The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres, amounted to terrorism. The assassination of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, the support for the Contras in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the bombing of Tripoli with 100 civilian casualties in 1986, are some American examples.

⁹ Chomsky, *loc cit*, p 65.

¹⁰ Since 1946, America has been running what amounted to a terrorist training camp, called the School of the Americas, based in Fort Benning, Georgia, which has trained more than 60,000 Latin American soldiers and policemen in techniques which included blackmail, torture, execution and the arrest of the relatives of witnesses.

SOA graduates worked in Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and elsewhere. An attempt in Congress to shut the school down failed; it was briefly closed, then reopened with a new name, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Co-operation, or WHISC. George Monblot, article in the *Guardian*, reprinted the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 November 2001; see also the website School of the Americas Watch at <http://www.soaw.org/new/>.

¹¹ Patrick Walters, 'Generals warn against Iraq war' in *The Weekend Australian*, 21 September 2002.

¹² Article 51 of the UN Charter reads: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

¹³ In 1837, an armed rebellion occurred in the (then) British colony of Canada. A ship, moored in United States waters, was suspected by the British of being used by certain individuals to supply arms to Canadian rebels. British forces boarded the ship and destroyed it, killing two people in doing so. In the ensuing political imbroglio Britain justified the attack as an exercise of self-defence; the American Secretary of State denied that, and asserted that a country claiming such a right must 'show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation ... [the act of self-defence must also involve] nothing unreasonable or excessive'. See, for example, K R Stevens, 1989, *Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs ... 1837-1842*.

¹⁴ An Act 'Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001'. October 24, 2001.

¹⁵ Richard Butler, 'Science, Weapons, Politics: the Ethics, the Hard Choices', Annual Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney, September 2002. Available at University of Sydney, Centre for Human Aspects of Science and Technology, <http://www.scifac.usyd.edu.au/chast>.

¹⁶ Brian Toohey, article in the *Sun-Herald*, 29 September 2002, p 27.

¹⁷ *The Australian*, 2 October 2002.

¹⁸ Mary Kaldor, 1990, *The Imaginary War*.